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1. INTRODUCrION
Law No. 2004-228,1 enacted by the French government in
March 2004 to ban conspicuous religious apparel in public schools,
has given the headscarf2 new prominence on the front pages of the
world's newspapers and has rekindled debate within-and
among3 -the world's multicultural secular democracies. There is a
certain irony in the headscarf's emergence as a point of contro-
versy. In principle, its purpose is to divert attention from the
* J.D. candidate 2005, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 1998,
Haverford College.
1 Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, J.O., Mar. 15, 2004, p. 5190; D.S.L. Mar.
25, 2004, 12, 854.
2 Also called a hejab or veil, "headscarf" is used here to refer generally to any
variety of head-dress worn by women in Islamic communities to cover the head
and neck, and, in some cases, the face. See ELISABETH OZDALGA, THE VEILING ISSUE,
OFFICIAL SECULARISM AND POPULAR ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY xiii-xvii (1998) (not-
ing that "veiling is a term that comprises many different ways of covering femi-
nine charms" by concealing both bodily features and the face, which differs from
the headscarf, or ba 6rti, which only covers the hair and shoulders).
3 American and British officials publicly criticized the law during the initial
debate, probably out of concern in the estimation of one journalist, that "the inte-
gration of Muslims in Western societies was too global an issue to be mishan-
dled." Diana Pinto, The Long, Bloody Path that Led to French Secularism, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Jan. 7, 2004, at 6. Non-secular states, unsurprisingly, are also send-
ing criticism. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., In France, Scarves and Secularism,
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 23, 2003 at A21 (quoting the Iranian Foreign Ministry
spokesman condemning the French government for "an extremist decision aimed
at preventing the development of Islamic values").
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woman beneath.4 Nonetheless, the headscarf sits at the center of
numerous disputes, from the subordination of women and con-
cerns about religious fundamentalism, to the protection of civil lib-
erties and respect for multiculturalism.
Many of the issues raised by the headscarf are admittedly un-
concerned with the women who wear them, just as many of the is-
sues are beyond these women's concern. But when state policies of
strict secularism call for headscarves to be banned, the conse-
quences extend further than the women who must choose between
faith and participation in society. Often missing from the debate is
consideration of strict secularism's economic effects. Such policies
have the potential to isolate orthodox communities from education
and employment, which creates a subclass without an avenue for
economic advancement. The despair and resentment that afflict
stagnated communities provide an efficient breeding ground for
fundamentalist demagogues and civil unrest and impose signifi-
cant costs on the greater society.
This Comment examines these concerns as they are faced by
two secular democracies: France, with the largest minority Muslim
population in Europe;5 and Turkey, with Europe's largest, and
only, majority Muslim population. 6 Although France and Turkey
approach their secularist policies from quite different perspectives,
the stakes are high for both. France is still coming to grips with a
major cultural transformation that began with a wave of immigra-
4 See Fatima Allaboun, An Objective Look at Hejab, 75-76 NOOR AL-ISLAM
(May-June 2001) (examining the role of the headscarf in Islamic custom and the-
ology), at http://www.nooralislam.org/last/7576/pdf7576/nor3.pdf; cf. Thomas
Fuller, Headscarf Chic; In Malaysia, Women Cover Up But in Colorful and Trendy Way,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 7, 1999, at 21 (observing that some see it as ironic that a
symbol of modesty is increasingly worn in eye-catching styles and subject to fash-
ion trends).
5 See Jim Bittermann, French Muslims Seek Stronger Voice, CNN.coM, Mar. 6,
2002 (reporting that 10% of French population identifies with Islam), at http://
cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/03/06/france.muslims. THE
WORLD FACTBOOK estimates the Muslim population figure in France at between
five and ten percent of a total population of 60 million. CIA, France, THE WORLD
FACTBOOK (2005), at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/fr.
html (last modified Feb. 10, 2005).
6 Turkey's population is estimated at just under 69 million. CIA, supra note 5,
at 547. Over ninety-nine percent of the Turkish population is Muslim, the major-
ity of whom are Sunnis. Id.; see also David Shankland, Religion, in TURKISH
TRANSFORMATION 79, 81 (Brian Beeley ed., 2002) (putting the Islamic population of
Turkey "in the region of 99 percent").
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tion from former colonies in North Africa over forty years ago.7
Turkey, meanwhile, is struggling to join the advanced economies
of Western Europe, despite a population that is largely uneducated
and poor.8 In both cases, governments have attempted to deal with
these challenges through strict secularist policies, with mixed re-
suits.
Section 2 of this Comment looks at secularism's cultural and
historical roots in Turkey and France. Section 3 examines the rela-
tionship between class and religion in order to understand who in
society is affected by policies of strict secularism. Section 4 dis-
cusses the effects of headscarf bans and similar laws on access to
employment and education. Finally, Section 5 questions whether
strict secularism must be a cornerstone of each country's goals: cul-
tural integration in the case of France; and economic advancement
in the case of Turkey.
7 See Cynthia DeBula Baines, Note, L'Affaire des Foulards - Discrimination, or
the Price of a Secular Public Education System?, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 303, 311-12
(1996) (describing France's policy of encouraging new immigrants to adopt French
customs and noting that adherence to traditional Muslim female dress restrictions
is "seen as opposition" to that policy).
8 See Mina Toks6z, The Economy: Achievements and Prospects, in TURKISH
TRANSFORMATION, supra note 6, at 141 (noting recent currency devaluations and
economic crises in Turkey); The United Nations Children Fund ("UNICEF"), At a
Glance: Turkey (listing education, especially of girls, among UNICEF's priorities
for improvement in Turkey), at http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/
Turkey.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
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2. THE ROOTS OF SECULARIST POLICY9
2.1. Clashes Between Secularists and Islamists in Turkey
When General Mustafa Kemal "Atatfirk" 10 led Turkey through
a nationalist uprising from within the crumbling Ottoman Empire
at the close of World War I, he was convinced that a break from the
sultanate past would be crucial to the new republic's success."
The changes he imposed amounted to a cultural revolution, and
central among them was an end to the unity of Islam and the
state. 12 More than an idealist, Atattirk was a pragmatist: the Ot-
toman Empire's defeat and occupation by the Allied powers were
evidence of the West's rapid industrial and economic advancement
in the last century, while in the East, the Sultans had ruled over a
gradual decline.' 3 The cultural defeat of an Islamic empire was far
more significant to Atattirk than the final military conquest; the
Turks' reemergence would require Turkey to adapt to the superior
culture of the West. 4 Atatfirk's design for the new country called
9 These surveys are necessarily brief. For a more extensive discussion of the
evolution of secularism in Turkey, see, for example, DIETRICH JUNG & WOLFGANG
PICCOLI, TURKEY AT THE CROSSROADS Pt. 1 (2001) (charting Turkish modernization
from Ottoman times); ARYEH SHMUELEvITZ, TURKEY'S EXPERIMENT IN ISLAMIST
GOVERNMENT, 1996-1997 (1999) (examining the brief success of the Islamist Wel-
fare Party); M. HAKAN YAVUZ, ISLAMIC POLITICAL IDENTITY IN TURKEY (2003) (recon-
ciling the modem construction of the Islamic political identity with the legacy of
Atattirk's secularizing reforms). For broader studies of French secularism, see, for
example, Guy COQ, LAIcrit ET RtPUBLIQUE: LE LIEN NICESSAIRE [SECULARISM AND
THE REPUBLIC: THE NECESSARY LINK] (1995) (following the role of secularism from
post-revolutionary to modern France); PERMANENCE DE LA LAICITt EN FRANCE Er
DANS LE MONDE [PERMANENCE OF SECULARISM IN FRANCE AND IN THE WORLD] (Alain
B.L. Gerard ed., 2001) (discussing French secularism's application to modem di-
lemmas involving immigration and integration); Baines, supra note 7 (examining
the roots of the French secular tradition and the mandate for secular public educa-
tion in particular).
10 "Atattirk," the name by which Kemal is remembered today, translates into
"father of the Turks."
11 See Susanna Dokupil, The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democ-
racy in Modem Turkey, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 65 (2002) (arguing that Atattirk's re-
forms sought to free his people from Ottoman customs).
12 See id. at 60 (explaining that the Ottoman Empire had "raised Islamic law
to a position of prime importance in state administration by combining the head
of state, the sultan, and the highest religious leader, the caliph, in the personage of
the padishah, who held the highest position in the Islamic view of world order.").
13 For an account of the Ottoman Empire's decline, see JUNG & PICCOLI, supra
note 9, at 47-53.
14 Dokupil, supra note 11, at 65.
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for a secular Western European state, planted amongst the Otto-
man ruins.'5 Of his "six arrows of Kemalism" -secularism, repub-
licanism, nationalism, populism, reformism, and 6tatism 16-none
would be as conspicuous or resisted as secularism.'
7
An old Turkish saying posits that government without religion
is not possible,18 but Atatiirk's ambition in this regard may explain
his enduring appeal among Turks. Islam played a central role in
the direction and administration of the Ottoman Empire; the unity
of mosque and state meant that both shared blame for the Ottoman
decline. Atatfirk's new republic therefore deposed the caliph, as
well as the sultan, abolished the sheriat courts, and adopted a
Swiss-modeled civil code.' 9 Restrictive laws in the 1920s and 1930s
were intended to prevent Islamists20 from posing a threat to the
secularization.21 Atatuirk insisted on abolishing religious schools
and religious titles. His government placed restrictions on tradi-
tional religious dress; banned "religious societies" (although or-
ganizations for the purposes of prayer or religious practice were
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See generally JUNG & PICCOLI, supra note 9, at 72-81 (looking at Atatairk's
"iconoclasim and the pivotal role of secularism in the Kemalist project"). The
secularization of the Turkish state was monumental, especially when one consid-
ers that the Ottomans had been accustomed to ruling an empire that spanned sev-
eral religions and cultures. Turkey, by contrast, is composed almost exclusively of
Muslims, many of whom could not understand why the new state should not re-
flect their newfound Islamic homogeneity. In fact, many of Atatairk's revolution-
ary followers believed they were fighting on behalf of Islam against the West, cer-
tain that despite the necessary end to the sultanate, the caliphate would remain a
principal foundation of government. Dokupil, supra note 11, at 67-68.
18 See Shankland, supra note 6, at 83 (observing that many of Turkey's mod-
em Islamists continue to support this assertion). On the other hand, the fervor
with which the state supports secularism suggests that it may have evolved into a
faith in its own right. See OZDALGA, supra note 2, at 1-2 (describing secularism as
the "official ideology" of the Turkish state).
19 Dokupil, supra note 11, at 68-69.
20 The Islamist position has traditionally sought to re-establish an Islamic
state in Turkey, although the term is sometimes used today to describe even mod-
erate political parties that embrace a Muslim identity. See Turkey: Social Condi-
tions, THE PRS GROUP, Oct. 1, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library, Turkey Coun-
try Files (citing tensions between Islamists, who favor an Islamic regime, and the
secularist followers of Atattirk); An Islamist Facing Islamic Terrorism, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 29, 2003 (describing Prime Minister Tayip Erdogan as an "Islamist at heart"
who has pledged support for Turkey's secularist orientation in the wake of Is-
lamic extremism).
21 Dokupil, supra note 11, at 68-69.
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still permitted); criminalized the teaching of Arabic script;22 and
prohibited political parties from conducting religious activities or
making religious propaganda.23 Kemalist secularism, however,
did not necessarily mean a sharp separation of church and state;
rather, the state learned to keep its hand in religion in order to con-
trol it.24
The successes of Atattrk's legacy also created new problems
for the secularists. The post-1945 industrialization, urbanization,
and education of millions of Turks helped to develop a new, more
sophisticated class of Islamists.25 With improved literacy came
greater demand for Islamic publications; the maturing democracy
sprouted organized supporters of popular Islam, no longer dis-
missible by secularists as a declining characteristic of rural life.26
Since Atattirk's death, the Turkish military has remained an en-
forcer of Kemalist policy, and the rise of Islamist influence in gov-
ernment has been a constant concern. Numerous times (in 1960,
1971, 1980, and 1997) the military intervened in government, either
directly or through heavy pressure, but always with the purpose of
"sav[ing] democracy." 27 More than once, the military claimed it
was protecting the vulnerable secular state from a religious politi-
cal party that had come to dominate the government. 28
22 Perhaps Atattirk's most staggering accomplishment was the complete re-
casting of the Turkish language into a Roman alphabet within the span of a few
generations. See JUNG & PICCOLI, supra note 9, at 60, 189 (noting several changes in
the cultural transformation of Turkish society and discussing the change to Latin
script in detail).
23 Dokupil, supra note 11, at 69.
24 See JUNG & PICCOLI, supra note 9, at 78 ("The introduction of secularism did
not separate state and religion, but was rather a move to take religion out of poli-
tics, while keeping the state involved in religious affairs."); Dokupil, supra note 11,
at 69 (citing the establishment of a President of Religious Affairs to administer
mosques and appoint imams as evidence of state involvement in religion); Shank-
land, supra note 6, at 94 (explaining that the government began overseeing reli-
gious teaching in schools and mosques in the 1980s).
25 OZDALGA, supra note 2, at 35.
26 Id.
27 Clement Dodd, Democracy and the European Union, in TURKISH
TRANSFORMATION, supra note 6, at 241-42. But cf. OZDALGA, supra note 2, at 89 (ar-
guing that popular Islam in Turkey has never seriously challenged the modem
polity).
28 See ERIK CORNELL, TURKEY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: OPPORTUNITIES,
CHALLENGES, THREATS 71-74 (2001) (citing self-description by the Turkish military
as "the representatives of a moral and self-sacrificing elite with a special responsi-
bility for the destiny of the country and the people").
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Despite the long shadow cast by Kemalist generals, the new po-
litical reality required compromise of Atattirk's restrictions on reli-
gious expression, even if at a very delicate pace. No act of legisla-
ture has ever directly prohibited the use of headscarves in public
settings, but regulation by universities and civil agencies has be-
come commonplace with the resurgence of Turkish Islamicism in
recent decades.29 In 1982, the Turkish Council of Higher Education
prohibited headscarves in all universities in response to pressure
from the military following the 1980 coup. 30 The policy proved dif-
ficult to implement and became the subject of negotiation and con-
cession between secularists and Islamists for years until the parties
ultimately agreed to leave the decision to the universities. 31 The
ban was eventually reinstated in 1997 after the most recent military
intervention, following attempts by the Welfare Party and the na-
tion's first Islamist prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, to rapidly
liberalize secular policy. 32 Although the Welfare party and its im-
mediate successor were both disbanded by the Turkish Constitu-
tional Court, the current government, controlled by the Justice and
Development Party ("AKP"), is considered a more moderate rein-
carnation of the failed Islamist parties.33 Prime Minister and AKP
leader Tayip Erdogan has made no attempt to downplay his own
religiousness, nor the fact that his wife wears a headscarf.34 On the
other hand, Erdogan has announced that he will proceed cau-
tiously regarding a possible lifting of the headscarf ban - a re-
minder that despite his party's popularity, the secular military re-
29 OZDALGA, supra note 2, at 39.
30 Id. at 41.
31 Id. at 43.
32 See Firdevs Robinson, Turkish Headscarf Ban Questioned, BBC NEws, Nov. 7,
2002 (citing the fact that a member of parliament had worn her headscarf in the
assembly as a reason for the Welfare party's censure by the Constitutional Court),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2416007.stm.
33 The 2002 elections, which swept the Justice and Development Party
("AKP") into power, were considered "a historical break in terms of providing to
a socially Muslim party an opportunity to restructure the political landscape and
expand the public sphere." YAVUZ, supra note 9, at 256. But despite winning
popular favor on Islamic cultural identity, the new government is more moderate
than Islamist: "The 2002 election thus was not about establishing an Islamic state
or instituting Islamic law, but rather about redrawing the boundary between the
state and society.., and reconstituting everyday life in terms of a shared vision of
'the good life.'" Id.
34 See Robinson, supra note 32 (reporting on Mr. Erdogan's efforts during the
2002 campaign to "steer clear of controversial issues" raised by the headscarf).
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mains entrenched in Turkish politics. 35
2.2. French Secularism and the Citizen
Although the modem French secular state has existed only
since 1905, just two decades before secularism arrived in Turkey,
the French struggle with religion had been ongoing since the 16th
century. Protestants were slaughtered at the hands of Catholics at
the massacre of Saint Barthelemy in 1572, and Catholics at the
hands of secular revolutionaries during the post-revolution Reign
of Terror.36 Secularization in France progressed under pressure
from two fronts. On one hand, there was a contest for political
power, first between the Pope and the King, and later between
Catholic loyalists and republicans.37 The republican mobilizations
in France and Turkey to strip the clerics of their political influence
are in some ways retellings of the same tale. But while the Turkish
version might end there, with secularism held forcibly in place by
the military, French separation of church and state was buoyed fur-
ther by popular acceptance. Enlightenment-era principles on the
inherent rights of individuals suggested that libert6 and lai'citd were
tightly intertwined. 38 The right of the citizen to have an identity
separate from the Church sought its guarantees alongside freedom
35 Erhan Ozturk, The Turban from Past to Present, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Dec.
25, 1999, available at http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old-editions/12-25-98/
feature.htm. It remains to be seen how far the prime minister can pursue this pol-
icy. His popularity remains high, but the reforms required for European Union
membership talks, as well as the current European political atmosphere in gen-
eral, favor commitment to a secularist agenda. See Vincent Boland, AKP Poised for
Easy Victory in Turkish Local Elections, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 3, 2004, at 8 (dis-
cussing the government's first test of popularity since coming to power).
36 Pinto, supra note 3, at 6.
37 See Alain Gresh, Aux origines des controverses sur la laiciti [On the Origins of
the Controversy over Secularism], LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Aug. 2003, at 18 (citing
the Catholic church as an ally of royalists in oppressing French protestants, as
well as the Pope's desire to affirm his own sovereignty).
38 See Henri Pena-Ruiz, Principes fondateurs et difinition de la lafcit6 [The Found-
ing Principles and Definition of Secularism], OBSERVATORIE DU COMMUNAUTARISME,
June 9, 2004 (drawing parallels between la'fcitL6- a term that roughly translates to
"secularism," but which emphasizes complete independence from the church,
rather than mere separation-and fundamental human rights), at
http://www.communautarisme.net/index.php3?action=page&idart=81736.
Pena-Ruiz was a member of the Stasi Commission appointed to make recommen-
dations regarding secularism to the French government. Id. See also infra text ac-
companying notes 48 and 49 (charting the evolution of French. policy on head-
scarves in schools).
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of expression and equality before the law.39 And where the Church
had for centuries made distinctions between Catholics and all oth-
ers, emerging republican ideals required that distinctions be set
aside, lest they confuse one's paramount status as citizen.
40
Secularist policy became increasingly important to the French
government by the second half of the 19th century,41 while the
church's continued opposition to liberal values 42 guaranteed that a
formal break between church and state would be imminent. With
the Separation Law of 1905,43 the government guaranteed free (if
limited) exercise of religion, and announced that the Republic
would neither recognize any state religion nor fund any religious
activity. Leading up to the law were other major reforms that le-
galized divorce, secularized cemeteries, and established manda-
tory, non-religious public schooling.44 By the end of World War 1I,
lafciti had become part of the French national identity, enshrined in
the Constitution of 1946, assuring equality to all citizens regardless
of belief.45 The gradual post-war decline of faith in France and
elsewhere in Europe,46 however, meant that the Law of 1905 now
rarely needed to flex its muscles.
However, with the influx of Muslim immigrants since de-
colonialization and growing numbers of veiled women in schools
and at the workplace, French complacency regarding the principle
of secularism has ended. Schools and local governments have at-
tempted to resolve the headscarf debate on their own for many
years.47 Regional prohibitions on the headscarf in schools have
been imposed sporadically since 1994, when the French education
minister permitted schools to ban "ostentatious" religious symbols,
although it was left to school principals to interpret the scope of the
39 Id. See also Baines, supra note 7, at 310-311 (citing tolerance, universalism,
and reason as the philosophical roots of French secularism).
40 Pena-Ruiz, supra note 38.
41 See Gresh, supra note 37 (describing pro-secular advances since 1870).
42 Dionne, supra note 3.
43 Law of Dec. 9, 1905, J.O., Dec. 11, 1905, p. 7205; D.P. IV 1906, IV, 1.
44 Gresh, supra note 37.
45 FR. CONST. pmbl. (4th Republic, 1946).
46 See Shankland, supra note 6, at 79 (citing as an example the decline of the
Church of England).
47 See Henri Astier, The Deep Roots of French Secularism, BBC NEWS, Sept. 1,
2004 (surveying the militancy of French secularism), at http://news.bbc.co.uk
/1/hi/world/europe/3325285.stm.
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decree.48 In 2003, with the appointment of the Stasi Commission
on Laicit6,49 the French government decided to look for a singular
policy. President Jacques Chirac embraced the Commission's rec-
ommendations,50 and quickly pushed forward a law that banned
all headscarves, yarmulkes, large crosses, and other ostentatious
displays of religion from classrooms.51 Prime Minister Jean-Pierre
Raffarin rallied to support the law, proclaiming that headscarves
are "a political challenge to the French republican ideal of freedom
and equality."
5 2
2.3. Contrasting Perspectives
Both Turkish and French policies of secularism developed from
a mistrust of religion's power to manipulate government, and both
countries had been heavily influenced by religious institutions un-
til the point of their respective republican revolutions. A key dis-
tinction, however, may be the nature of the populations upon
which secularist policies are imposed. In France, as in most of
Western Europe, the church's influence is waning, but for most
Turks, the mosque is still quite important and relevant.53 Turkish
scholar David Shankland frames the question in Turkey as "how
may the expansion [of faith] ... be channeled, controlled and led so
48 Id.
49 The Commission was formed on July 3, 2003 by President Chirac, who ap-
pointed Bernard Stasi as its president. See Lara Marlowe, Saving Muslim Women
from a Piece of Cloth, IR. TIMES, July 12, 2003, at 13 (reporting on the Commission's
headscarf investigations).
50 The Stasi Report, a long and dense homage to French laIcit6 that traces
secularism's development from Greek antiquity to modern times, was published
in its entirety by LE MONDE. The Commission's recommendations cited public
education's central role in the development of citizens, and the Republic's duty to
protect the equality of the sexes. Le rapport de la Commission Stasi sur la lailiti [The
Report of the Stasi Commission on Secularism], LE MONDE, Dec. 12, 2003, at 17. In a
speech given shortly before the new law was passed, Chirac praised the principle
of secularism as a keystone of the Republic, guiding common values of respect,
tolerance, and dialogue. President Jacques Chirac, Speech on the Principle of
Secularism in the Republic (Dec. 17, 2003), available at http://www.elysee.fr/cgi-
bin/auracom/aurweb/search/file?aur file=discours/ 2003/D031217.html.
51 Law No. 2004-228 of March 15, 2004, J.O., Mar. 15, 2004, p. 5190; D.S.L.
Mar. 25, 2004, 12, 854; see also Jon Henley, French MPs Reappraise Plan to Outlaw
Veils: Schools Ban Forms Focus for Discontent, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 20, 2004, at 11
(reporting on the expected backlash in response to the perceived extremism of the
new law).
52 Elaine Sciolino, French Premier Urges Approval of Scarf Ban; Raffarin Makes a
Them-Against-Us Appeal, INT'L HERALD TRI., Feb. 4, 2004, at 3.
53 Shankland, supra note 6, at 79.
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as to satisfy the twin necessities of the freedom of religious belief
and the prevention of the dominance of their version of religion
over other, less numerous or less forceful forms of faith?" 4 By
comparison, in France, the intensity of faith has noticeably shifted
to the Muslim population, often raising the concern of the increas-
ingly skeptical, or at least the unpracticing, majority. While Turk-
ish secularist law extends from a minority (the government and the
military) over the majority, French secularist law extends from the
majority over a minority. But both countries have agreed that
when the principle of secularism is not voluntarily adopted by
their respective Muslim populations, it must be imposed by force
for the sake of national integrity. This position of strict secularism
may present its own dangers.
3. CLASS AND RELIGION: WHO IS AFFECTED BY SECULARIST
POLICIES?
It would be too great a simplification to assume that only those
who are religious orthodox must reconcile with secularist restric-
tions, or even that they are necessarily affected at all.55 The inter-
section of orthodox observance and economic standing draws a ba-
sic grid on which we can begin to plot the impact of secularist
policies. First, not all members of a religious community practice
in the same way or for the same reasons. Second, citizens depend
54 Id.
55 This Comment assumes that headscarves are worn because of a personal
and voluntary faith. This is not always the case, particularly in families and
communities where women have little autonomy. See generally Kathleen Miller,
The Other Side of the Coin: A Look at Islamic Law As Compared To Anglo-American
Law -Do Muslim Women Really Have Fewer Rights Than American Women, 16 N.Y.
INT'L L. REv. 65 (2003) (discussing women's autonomy in Muslim countries
around the world). However, there is also evidence that today in France, many
Muslim women who wear headscarves are choosing to do so despite their moth-
ers' efforts to integrate without wearing it. See Jeremy Landor, Unveiling France,
AL-AHRAm WEEKLY, Dec. 25-31, 2003 ("Their father... has tried everything to dis-
suade his daughters from wearing headscarves."), at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg
/2003/670/in13.htm. Turkey is seeing a similar phenomenon. See Feride Acar,
Women and Islam in Turkey, in WOMEN IN MODERN TURKISH SocIETY 46,60-64 (Sirin
Tekeli ed., 1995) (describing the "incomprehensible anomaly" of educated women
from less conservative families choosing to adopt the headscarf and Islamist val-
ues despite familial concern). Protesting secularist policies may be evolving into a
new form of feminism. See Ye~im Arat, Feminism and Islam: Considerations on the
Journal Kadin ve Aile, in WOMEN IN MODERN TURKISH SociETY 66, 75 (Sirin Tekeli
ed., 1995) (arguing that in modem Turkey, where there is no imminent threat of
an Islamic state, "women's religious activism can open new avenues of power and
vistas beyond the familial realm.").
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on state social services, such as education or employment, to vary-
ing degrees. Therefore, in one quadrant of our grid we find those
for whom social services are dispensable but religious observance
is not. For this group, secularist laws such as a headscarf ban do
not require a change in behavior or the sacrifice of faith, but simply
enrollment in private school or employment in the unregulated
private sector. Another quadrant of the grid hosts citizens who
value social services above religious observance, and would show
little grief in removing their headscarf to enter a university build-
ing or a courtroom. The quadrant that hosts citizens indifferent
both to religion and social services need not concern us at all. But
the last quadrant is the most troubling, home to those citizens who
are inflexible along both the religious and economic axes. Coun-
tries must identify this segment of the population when consider-
ing the impact of secularist policy: people for whom faith man-
dates orthodox observance, but have few or no other alternatives
when the state mandates compliance.
3.1. Religion and Class Patterns in Turkey
Although 60% of Turkey's population now lives in urban cen-
ters, the rest-nearly thirty million people-live in largely rural
and economically depressed areas.56 Turkey's GDP per capita in
2003 was $6,700, but this data is somewhat misleading given the
concentration of wealth.57 By some estimates, average annual in-
comes have remained stagnant at $2,500-$3,000 for the last dec-
ade,58 with roughly 16% of families living below the poverty line.5 9
Forty percent of the population still derives its income from agri-
culture,60 and there is an abundance of unskilled labor.61 In the
eastern part of the country, which remains quite rural and poor,
56 UNICEF, supra note 8. See also EROL (;AKMAK, AGRICULTURAL POLICY
REFORMS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY (Sept. 3, 1998) (citing the statistic
that in 1994, rural average income per household was 42% lower than urban
households), available at http://www.worldbank.org/mdf/mdf2/papers
/econdev/cakmak.pdf.
57 CIA, Turkey, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2005), at http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/tu.htm (last modified Feb. 10, 2005).
58 ToksOz, supra note 8, at 141.
59 Qakmak, supra note 56.
60 Toks6z, supra note 8, at 143. The Political Risk Services ("PRS") Group es-
timates the figure is closer to 45%. Turkey: Labor, THE PRS GROUP, Oct. 1, 2004,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Turkey Country Files.
61 Turkey: Labor, supra note 60.
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birth rates are double that of Turkey's western region, and infant
mortality rates are also higher.62 Unemployment for 2003 is esti-
mated at 12%,63 with underemployment at 6%.64 Inflation rates,
while dropping from peaks in the high double digits to 18.4% in
2003,65 remain problematic.
Formal education in Turkey still lags behind European stan-
dards, particularly for girls. According to a United Nations Chil-
dren Fund ("UNICEF") report, one in eight girls is out of school. 66
"The tradition of placing low values on girls and women-
especially those from poorer families in urban settlements and ru-
ral areas-coupled to a high rate of illiteracy are primarily to
blame." 67 The national government has recognized that the public
education system needs major improvement in order for Turkey to
reach its economic goals. Initiatives passed in 1997 and 200268
aimed to build more classrooms, encourage attendance, and extend
the years of compulsory schooling from the fifth grade to the
eighth grade.69 Still, one million children are working rather than
attending school, and most of the country's rural villages still do
not have a school that goes beyond grade five. 70
The lack of a large and influential middle class is an obstacle to
Turkey's economic progress.71 As a result, there is a "cultural di-
vide between a ruling westernized elite and the deeply religious
masses in the countryside and in the small towns [that has] estab-
62 Brian Beeley, People and Cities: Migration and Urbanization, in TURKISH
TRANSFORMATION, supra note 6, at 40.
63 Turkey: Labor, supra note 60.
64 CIA, Turkey, supra note 57.
65 Id.
66 UNICEF, supra note 8.
67 Id.
68 These initiatives were the First (1997) and Second (2002) Basic Education
Projects, respectively. See World Bank, Turkey: Second Basic Education Project
(2002-2005) (pursuing the goals of increased coverage and quality of basic educa-
tion for poor children, and expanded coverage of formal and non-formal pre-
school programs), available at http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects
/main?pagePK=104231&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Proje
ctid=P059872 (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
69 Id.; see Douglas Frantz, As Turkey's Schools Open, a Million Are Left Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, at A4 (discussing the numerous factors that contribute to the
decline of school attendance throughout Turkey).
70 Frantz, supra note 69.
71 See Toks~z, supra note 8, at 143 (explaining that despite the recent presence
of a middle class, political influence has remained elusive because of the large
number of agricultural laborers who maintain influence on most legislation).
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lished ... one of the most outstanding societal cleavages of Turkish
society and polity." 72 In rural areas, where family and community
are social pillars, religion has proved much more resistant to gov-
ernment attempts to secularize and modernize the population.73
Even as the population continues to shift toward urban centers, ties
to religion remain strong. Turkish political divides reflect this
phenomenon: "The Islamist-secularist divide reflected the tradi-
tional centre-periphery one... [but now] parts of the cities them-
selves have become culturally and socially ruralized with the in-
flux of immigrants from the countryside." 74 Cities are becoming
increasingly populated with poorer Islamists,75 while the more
secular middle class remains politically weak.76
The lack of an influential middle class is not uncommon among
developing countries; but in Turkey the phenomenon may have
historical as well as economic roots. Democracy in Turkey was
largely the vision of Atattirk, with its protection entrusted to his
faithful in the military. While the political dialogue has involved
the secular generals and popular Islamists, the secular bourgeoisie
has been able to rely on the military without itself shouldering the
burden of Atattirk's legacy.
3.2. The Muslim Minority in France
Precise data on the economic situation of Muslims in France is
difficult to come by. The government does not collect information
on ethnic or religious minorities, in part because it offends the re-
publican ideal of equality of the citizen; and in part because of re-
sidual sensitivity related to the uses to which both occupying Na-
zis and the Vichy Government put the records collected on French
Jews during World War II.77 Most reports are anecdotal or assem-
72 Sencer Ayata, The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Institutional Frame-
work, in THE POLITICAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF TURKEY 51 (Atila
Erla et al. eds., 1993).
73 Id.
74 William Hale, Democracy and the Party System in Turkey, in TURKISH
TRANSFORMATION, supra note 6, at 179.
75 See Turkey: Social Conditions, supra note 20 (citing Turkey's widening in-
come disparity and the success of Islamists in gaining supporters among the poor
in Ankara and Istanbul).
76 Toks~z, supra note 8, at 143.
77 See HAUT CONSEIL A L'INTtGRATION [HIGH COUNCIL ON INTEGRATION],
L'ISLAM DANS LA REPUBLIQUE [ISLAM IN THE REPUBLIC] 25 (Nov. 2000) (observing
methodological difficulties due to the fact that "France does not authorize produc-
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bled by nongovernmental organizations.
According to a report prepared by the Franco-British Council,
Muslim immigrants in France "tend to be found at the most disad-
vantaged levels of society" both in terms of socioeconomics and
education.78 Muslim communities often show signs of distress fa-
miliar to struggling minorities: crime, unemployment, broken
families, and abuse of women.79 For many Muslims in France,
however, the situation has an added burden: the cultural demands
of the internal and external communities are at odds. One woman,
a 24-year-old daughter of Moroccan immigrants, explained,
[In my community] I feel safe, because everyone is Arab.
But the France outside is a France of racism, and the racism
has gotten worse since Sept. 11 .... If you dress with a veil,
no one here bothers you... [blut the French, when they see
a woman who wears the veil, they think "terrorist." 80
Many new or recent immigrants find themselves isolated in
public housing high-rises that are plagued by crime, and it is often
in these communities that fundamentalist Islamic leaders look for
young followers. 81 Unemployment in these projects is frequently
double the national average, at nearly 20%.82 This is not to suggest
that Islam and poverty are co-dependent; rather, it explains why
many immigrants see little incentive to embrace the French gov-
ernment's policy of integration, and with it, secularism. Religion
becomes an identifying cultural tie amongst those facing similar
challenges.
For second- or third-generation immigrants, there is the addi-
tional burden of feeling distanced from both the old and the new
culture. Here, too, religion plays an important role. Many of the
young women in headscarves are the French-born children of im-
tion of statistics on religious groups."), available at http://islamlaicite.org/img/
pdf/isl_ repuht_conseil.pdf.
78 JEAN-MARIE LE BRETON, MUSLIMS IN FRANCE AND BRITAIN (Nov. 1998), avail-
able at http://www.francobritishcouncil.org.uk/reports/muslims.pdf.
79 Elaine Sciolino, Muslims Remaking Old France, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 10,
2003, at 7.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Neo Hui Min, Integrating the Migrants, STRArrs TIMES (Singapore), Mar. 2,
2004, available at LEXIS, News Library.
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migrant parents, facing an identity crisis unique to their genera-
tion: their parents' values have become foreign as the family settles
into a new country; but acceptance from their classmates remains
elusive.83 Islam offers them both identity and a sense of belong-
ing.84 Others are frustrated that the nation is slow in turning its at-
tention to the plight of many of its Muslim citizens and residents.
"For some second-generation migrants, wearing a headscarf or
turning to militancy is a way of expressing anger over poverty and
unemployment."85 Unless conditions improve, religious militancy,
even if only expressed through traditional Muslim dress, will likely
gain appeal.
4. SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS OF STRICT SECULARISM
4.1. Access to Education and Professions in Turkey
In a report on Turkish education for an Islamist news maga-
zine, Yusuf Progler offers the case study of Nuray, a student at
Yildiz University in Istanbul, for whom the consequences of the
government's secularist policies are plain: "If I cover myself they
won't let me go to school, and I will not be able to get a job ....
Even though my academic numbers are high, if I continue to wear
my scarf, I will not be able to continue my education." 86 Nuray,
however, is in a relatively strong situation. She has already com-
pleted secondary school; and thus far she has found ways to allow
her religious beliefs and the state's secularist requirements to co-
exist.87 This is characteristic of women from middle-class families
in Istanbul or other cities.
Poorer, rural, or more strictly orthodox families are affected by
the state's secularist regulations in more profound ways. For thou-
sands of women, headscarf prohibitions require abandoning hopes
for joining professional-class careers in medicine, science or educa-
83 Jennifer Joan Lee, Expulsions over Veil Intensify French Debate on Secularity,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 21, 2003, at 19.
84 Id.
85 Min, supra note 82.
86 Yusuf Progler, In Muslim Turkey, Battle Looms on the Education Front,
MUSLIMEDIA, Sept. 16-30, 1998, available at http://www.muslimedia.com/ar-
chives/special98/eduturk.htm.
87 See id. (reporting that many Turkish schoolgirls wear their headscarves
outside of school, thus only observing the prohibition while attending class).
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tion.88 Some families choose to send their daughters to schools in
other countries. For Prime Minister Erdogan, this means institu-
tions in the United States or Great Britain.8
9
Other families are not so fortunate. Recent investigations into
the November 2003 terrorist attacks in Istanbul led Turkish inves-
tigators to a Turkish Islamic theological school located in Syria.
Many of the detainees picked up by the investigation, and later re-
leased without charges, were schoolgirls whose families sent them
abroad to study so that they could wear the Islamic headscarf and
otherwise avoid the constraints of Turkey's strict secularist re-
gime.90  The concern among nongovernmental organizations
watching the situation is that many families choosing to send their
children abroad to maintain religious practices cannot afford the
options available to their Prime Ministers and are forced to turn to
less costly, more local, and perhaps more radical alternatives.
Studying abroad in impoverished Islamic countries, children from
such families will find greater contact with zealots and other radi-
cal elements.91 Families who send their children to Turkey's own
state-run religious imam hatips schools face another barrier: gradu-
ates are barred altogether from entering public universities.92 Al-
though imam hatips schools do not show signs of Islamic militancy
among their pupils, 93 there is the fear that the discrimination
against them may prompt parents to send their children to what
Turkey's Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul called "radical, under-
ground establishments." 94 But attempts by the Erdogan govern-
ment to ease the restrictions on religious school graduates met stiff
resistance.95
Another serious effect of the headscarf ban, particularly in rural
88 Human Rights Watch, Memorandum to the Turkish Government on Human
Rights Watch's Concerns with Regard to Academic Freedom in Higher Education, and
Access to Higher Education for Women who Wear the Headscarf, Briefing Paper, at 29
(June 29, 2004) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch], available at http://hrw.org/
backgrounder/eca/turkey/2004/.
89 See Robinson, supra note 32 (remarking that the Turkish prime minister
chose to send his daughters abroad for their education).
90 Veiled Threats, ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2003, at 46.
91 Id.
92 Schools for Trouble, ECONoMisT, May 22, 2004, at 48.
93 See id. (describing boys and girls mingling freely, studying the same sub-
jects as in secular school, and spending their free time watching music, television,
or surfing the internet).
94 Id.
95 Id.
2005]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
areas, may be that many families will simply choose not to send
their daughters to school at all. In one case study, a Turkish
woman recalls that her family never wanted her to go to primary
school; she had to struggle to get their permission at each step of
her educational advancement. 96 When she finally reached univer-
sity, she faced opposition from the school's administration due to
her headscarf. 97 Another woman profiled in the same study high-
lights the relationship between religion and economics: "I would
rather take any kind of job [than remove the veil], like looking after
children or working as a cleaner. Believe me, I have very honestly
considered such simple occupations as [a way] out."
98
Turkey's secularist policies are not limited to schoolgirls and
university students. The headscarf is banned in all public institu-
tions, from courthouses to the parliament building.99 Perhaps the
most sensational clash of secularism and religion involved former
Istanbul Member of Parliament, Merve Kavakci, who in 1999 ar-
rived for her swearing-in wearing a headscarf. When she refused
demands to leave the chamber, she was aggressively escorted out-
side by other members of parliament.100 In another example, a
lawyer was dismissed from the Turkish Bar for wearing her head-
scarf to trial.1 1 Neither of these women has suffered irreparable
harm as a result of their defiance, 102 but the policies' effects do not
stop at women who would seek to become lawyers or politicians.
By one estimate, 65% of Turkish women wear the headscarf.103 The
Islamist organization Mazlumder, which supports women im-
pacted by the government's secularist policies, claims that since the
ban was reinstated in 1997, 10,000 women in Istanbul have been
excluded from universities.10 4 The result is that opportunities, or at
96 OZDALGA, supra note 2, at 55.
97 See id. at 52-54 (describing a university's practice of barring women in
headscarves from taking final examinations).
98 Id. at 72.
99 Ozturk, supra note 35.
100 Headscarf Claims Political Scalp, BBC NEWS, May 6, 1999, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/337323.stm.
101 Ozturk, supra note 35.
102 See id. (noting that Merve Kavakci has since moved to the United States,
while the dismissed lawyer, Emine Aykenar, began writing for a national news-
paper).
103 Tabitha Morgan, Scarf Conundrum Grips Turkey, BBC NEWS, Feb. 25, 2004,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3513259.stm.
104 Id.
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the very least incentives, for economic advancement through edu-
cation are reduced. Islamist women who are prepared to enter
university often come from families where the parents have little
education beyond primary school. 05 Their fathers are frequently
workers, shopkeepers, or low-ranking civil servants. 106 For these
women, the failure of the government to respect their identity is
more than merely frustrating; it impedes the social advancement of
the lower classes and the expansion of a broad-based Turkish mid-
dle class.
Although the headscarf is the most commonly attacked symbol
of religious expression, secularist policies do not affect women ex-
clusively. One report found that 18 officers and NCOs had been
purged from the Turkish military on account of their "excessive re-
ligious zeal." 107 Members of the armed forces are also under sig-
nificant pressure to ensure their wives do not wear headscarves, or
at least, are not photographed wearing them. 08 The Supreme Mili-
tary Council issued this notice to an army major: "Although you
were informed on the change concerning modem dress... [in] the
lodgings' zone, we determined your wife was not modernly
dressed both in the entrance and in the area of the lodgings. I am
warning you on the issue. If you repeat, we will take the necessary
action."109 A number of similar cases were reported by the Turkish
Daily News in 2003, many of them ultimately resulting in the sol-
diers' dismissals. According to the author of the report, the dis-
missals had negative impacts on the soldiers beyond the loss of
their jobs; they also lost community status and the right to receive
social aid." 0
4.2. Reinforcing Minority Isolation in France
In France, the effects of secularist policies are less widespread
because they touch a much smaller population. But as this popula-
tion grows, and as new laws are more actively enforced, the con-
105 Acar, supra note 55, at 54-55.
106 Id.
107 Turkey: Most Likely Regime Scenario, THE PRS GROUP, Oct. 1, 2004, available
at LEXIS, News Library, Turkey Country Files.
108 Supreme Military Council and Rule of Law, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Aug. 4,
2003, available at http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old-editions/08-04-03/fea-
ture.htm.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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frontation could be significant. The effects are additionally com-
plicated because of the often-tense relationship between the Mus-
lim and non-Muslim cultures in France. This became apparent
when a bank security guard in Paris refused to allow a customer to
enter because she was wearing a headscarf."' Although the guard
believed he was simply enforcing an anti-robbery bank regulation
that required removal of all head coverings, the incident sparked
outcry from Muslims already frustrated by the recommendations
of the Stasi Commission."
2
Tension regarding the headscarf has been building for years.
In 1997, twenty girls from Lille were expelled from school for
wearing headscarves. In response, their parents opened the coun-
try's first private Muslim school, although they faced significant
administrative hurdles and scrutiny." 3 In 2003, a French-Algerian
woman was suspended from her government job for wearing a
headscarf."4 She sued the government to be reinstated, declaring
at a tribunal hearing, "I like my profession and I am a Muslim. I
don't want to have to choose between the two."" 5
Until 2004, state policies of secularism had been enforced on a
case-by-case basis, with particularly zealous secular teachers or lo-
cal government administrators leading the charge against the
headscarf. The new law, however, requires teachers in all regions
to enforce the ban.116 The result may be that a number of orthodox
Muslim schoolgirls and families will be faced with a sudden and
difficult choice: whether to forgo the headscarf or the public
school system. Because the French national education system is so
closely identified with cultural integration, its abandonment by a
large number of conservative Muslims would be a significant set-
111 See Headscarf Woman Kept out of Bank, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 27, 2003
(quoting a bank spokesperson describing the security guard as "over-zealous"),
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/
12/27/wscarf27.xml&sSheet=/news/2003/12/27/ixworld.html.
112 Id.
113 See Laurence Peter, Headscarf Row Vexes Lille Muslims, BBC NEWS, Dec. 19,
2003 (noting that the director of the school believes more Muslim schools may
open elsewhere in France as a result of the new law), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3333047.stm.
114 Marlowe, supra note 49.
115 Id.
116 See French Senate Votes Ban on Religious Insignia in State Schools, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESS, Mar. 3, 2004, LEXIS, News Library, AFP File [hereinafter AFP] (dis-
cussing the passage of the bill as well as the support and opposition surrounding
the legislation).
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back to goals of integration." 7 Although there have been large
demonstrations in response to the legislation,118 there is no clear
indication of what the long term effects of its passage will be on
France's Muslim population. But to the extent that the law resem-
bles a broad backlash against Muslims by the majority, 1" 9 even in-
tegration-minded, progressive French Muslims will find it harder
to promote compromise amidst growing resentment and mili-
tancy. 20 If Turkish experience serves as a guide, it may not be real-
istic for the French government to assume that Muslim women will
remove their headscarves rather than seek alternatives outside the
mainstream social structure. And if predictions that the new regu-
lations will soon be extended to hospitals and public offices hold
true,121 the burdens on those who refuse to comply will mount.
5. Do STRICT SECULAR POLICIES Do MORE HARM THAN GOOD?
The conventional wisdom in both Turkey and France is that re-
quiring populations to secularize will allow them to fully partici-
pate in modern society, while keeping in check the more extreme
forces that tend to push for Islamic law or further isolate pockets of
the population. In Turkey, as recent terrorist attacks have demon-
strated, the opposition to the secular government is quite real. 122 In
France, the concern is not that fundamentalist or radical Muslims
would begin to pressure the national government, but rather that
they would displace local governments in the administration of
isolated communities, essentially halting efforts to integrate immi-
117 See Sciolino, supra note 79, at 59 (citing integration as a prime objective
that must be pursued).
118 See Henley, supra note 51 (reporting that 30,000 to 40,000 Muslims took
part in demonstrations against the ban in cities around France).
119 See AFP, supra note 116 (estimating that nearly 70 percent of French peo-
ple support the new law favoring strict separation of state and religion in public
institutions).
120 See Astier, supra note 47 ("[Miodernisers ... say a ban would only
strengthen the militants, and point out that the principles of secularism are not set
in stone and can accommodate exceptions."); see generally, FARHAD
KHOSROKHAVAR, L'ISLAM DES JEUNES [ISLAM OF THE YOUTH] (1997) (discussing the
indoctrination of young Muslims in the French suburbs).
121 See The War of the Headscarves- Integrating Minorities, EcoNoMIST, Feb. 7,
2004 (predicting that such laws will follow given the popularity of the school
regulation in parliament).
122 However, radical opposition does not appear mainstream. See An Islamist
Facing Islamic Terrorism, supra note 20 (reporting that few moderate Turks approve
of al Qaeda, which claimed responsibility for the Istanbul bombings).
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grant populations 23 It is not obvious, however, that applying
policies of strict secularism necessarily helps either country ad-
dress these concerns.
To many critics, such policies have the opposite result-
isolating religious populations in economic and cultural exile. As
one editorial proclaimed against French schools that had inde-
pendently decided to expel veiled Muslim students, "[tihe punitive
approach of some schools can only 'accentuate the injustices which
working class youth suffer in the districts where they live, espe-
cially those who are children of post-colonial immigration.'" 124
Another criticism levied against secularist policies is that they
address the wrong issue, attacking neutral-but conspicuous-
displays of faith, while ignoring the real problems facing the peo-
ple who wear them. Attacking the proposed law, French activists
wrote in an open letter to the government:
Veiled pupils... are a scapegoat for the problems in
French schools: bad behaviour, a high level of truancy and
sexist and racist insults and graffiti .... 'The main problems
are socioeconomic and political: liberalisation of the econ-
omy, mass unemployment, instability of employment,
growing social control and security-driven policies, racial
discrimination and social inequality between men and
women....,25
Following the street protests, French Muslim leader Karim
Bozid declared, "'The headscarf question is political manipula-
tion'.... 'The real issues for us are high unemployment in the
Muslim community, violence and harassment, discrimination in
123 There is also the concern that the growing radicalism found in poverty-
stricken Muslim communities, if left unchecked, could provide a source for terror-
ist recruitment. See Sciolino, supra note 52 (reporting that some French politicians
claimed that the law was necessary to "staunch the spread of radical Islam from
outside"). But it was the law's passage that has caught the eye of militant Islamic
organizations. See AFP, supra note 116 ("French anti-terrorism experts were tak-
ing seriously a warning from bin Laden's right-hand man Ayman al-Zawahiri
who said.. . that the headscarf ban was in the same league as 'the burning of vil-
lages in Afghanistan, the destruction of houses over the heads of their inhabitants
in Palestine, [and] the massacre of children and the theft of oil in Iraq.").
124 Landor, supra note 55 (quoting an open letter opposing the ban published
by a group of intellectuals and activists).
125 Id. (quoting the same open letter).
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jobs and housing. The strife is only just beginning, believe me.'" 126
Students who feel pushed away by secularist policies may not
be without alternatives, but these alternatives do not further the
government's goals. Foreigners have shown themselves willing to
finance Islamic education in both France and Turkey.127 But for-
eign-supplied education cripples the government's role in oversee-
ing educational standards. And in France, where integration de-
pends on individuals placing their identity as French citizens
above any ethnic or religious classification,128 secularist policies
may strengthen distinct nonintegrated identities. This possibility
has not been missed on some French politicians debating the pro-
posed law. Francois Bayrou of the centrist party UDF declared, "I
had my reservations, and I still have them, about a law that can
only pour oil on the fires of extremism .... In the aim of fighting
extremism, we are in fact abandoning the field."1
29
French supporters of strict secularist policy believe that the
headscarf ban will do more to prevent the splintering of society
than critics realize.130 They cite the demands by some Islamic lead-
ers for additional accommodations, notably single-sex sessions at
public swimming pools and other forms of state-sanctioned gender
segregation.131 But these arguments ignore the fundamental im-
portance of public education in both integrating diverse popula-
tions and in reducing the likelihood of economic isolation. Like
Turkey, this point is particularly important because the risks are
significant. If Islamic communities do not feel that the government
is making an attempt to meet them halfway, what incentives do
they have to sacrifice other tenets of their faith in order to inte-
grate?
In Turkey, where the distribution of income is already among
the most imbalanced within Europe,132 strict application of secular
policy does little to bridge the gap between the classes. Backlash
126 Henley, supra note 51 (quoting Muslim leader Karim Bourgid).
127 See Le Breton, supra note 78, at 4 (reporting that in France, 95% of imams
come from abroad, with theological training of "dubious quality"); Veiled Threats,
supra note 90 (discussing the foreign presence of Islamic support in these nations).
128 See Le Breton, supra note 78, 4-6 (describing the French approach to inte-
gration that avoids multiculturalism and focuses instead on individual endeavor).
129 Henley, supra note 51.
130 See Marlowe, supra note 49 (quoting Alain Jupp6, head of Jacque Chirac's
political party, as supporting the ban in order to prevent "apartheid").
131 Id.
132 CIA, Turkey, supra note 57.
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against the current regime is a valid concern, given the support for
a more Islamic (or Islamist-sympathetic) government among the
population. Turkey's reliance on military-backed hardliners to en-
force the secular agenda in Ankara has been effective, but groups
like Human Rights Watch have declared that Turkey's flat prohibi-
tion on headscarves violates principles of human rights no less
than the forced adoption of headscarves in Iran or Saudi Arabia.
133
Furthermore, the military backstop may no longer be an option. In
2004, constitutional reforms passed by the Turkish Parliament in-
cluded the removal of military representatives from the Council of
Higher Education.M As a European Union candidate, Turkey is
expected to further reduce the military's capacity for intervention
in government. 35
Whether Turkey's current policies against religious expression
would satisfy Atattirk's expectations is difficult to judge. During
the fall of the Ottoman regime, radical westernizers believed that a
wholesale importation of European civilization was the only path
for a return to prosperity. Secularism was an integral part of early-
twentieth-century Western Europe; to exclude secularism from the
package was inconceivable. 136 This perspective contrasts with
modern-day concerns about growing fundamentalism in Turkey
and elsewhere in the Muslim world. There is no Ottoman Empire
to return to; the fundamentalist threat, therefore, is a different one.
Modern demands by extremists for an Islamic state are not simply
echoes from the sultanate past. But while the world has changed,
Turkish policies on religion have been surprisingly stubborn.
Modernization and economic advancement cannot continue if
133 Human Rights Watch, supra note 88, at 23-24. The current Turkish consti-
tution, written after the 1980 military coup, protects human rights such as free-
dom of expression, but states that such rights cannot be used to violate the integ-
rity of the state or impose a system of government based on religion. Prohibition
on headscarves has long been considered protected under that clause. Turkey:
Government & Political Conditions, THE PRS GROUP, Oct. 1, 2004, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Turkey Country Files.
134 Human Rights Watch, supra note 88, at 5.
135 See European Union: Turkey's Entry into the EU, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 29,
2003 (citing far-reaching reforms to reduce the military's day-to-day management
of the country), available at http://www.iht.com/articles/115573.html.
136 See OZDALGA, supra note 2, at 9 (quoting one Ottoman westernizer as say-
ing, "[Clivilization means European civilization and it must be imported with
both its roses and its thorns."). But see N.S. RAJAMAN, SECULARISM: THE NEW MASK
OF FUNDAMENTALISM 5 (1995) (criticizing the importation of secularism by non-
European countries because secularization was Europe's answer to Church tyr-
anny and not necessarily an appropriate response for other cultures or regions).
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much of the country feels isolated by secularist policies, particu-
larly when there is a fundamentalist movement at home and
abroad that is happy to receive them.
To ensure that future governments remain moderate, Turkey's
best insurance will be to soften its secularist policies, reducing the
political ammunition available to radical parties. Traditionally,
hawkish generals have led the charge that laws such as the head-
scarf ban must be enforced "to curb the religious militancy that the
headscarf symbolizes." 137 But if the 2003 suicide bombings jolted
awareness that Turkey is a target of al Qaeda-style fundamental-
ism, 138 there is much to remind Turks that they have achieved rela-
tive stability as a democracy. The widely popular AKP govern-
ment has strived to present itself as a moderate Islamic party, thus
far able to bridge gaps between Islamists and the military, as well
as between proreform EU supporters and their skeptics. 139 But the
government's popularity may have less to do with its centrism
than with its perception as less corrupt and more concerned with
the welfare of the Turkish population than more secular rivals
40
The Political Risk Services ("PRS") Group predicts a stable eco-
nomic and political outlook for Turkey, describing AKP as "fairly
competent at managing the country's economy, and [receiving]
generally high marks from international institutions such as the
IMF." 141 The return to positive economic growth and lower infla-
tion 142 is more than a sign of stability; the data suggest that a loos-
ening of some secularist policies may do much to ensure that fu-
ture growth touches the breadth of the population. In the current
climate, it is unlikely that the headscarf would symbolize much at
all -perhaps conservatism, but hardly militancy. And easing the
ban would help to unite the millions of Turks who embrace their
own country's brand of moderate Islam against more radical ele-
137 Veiled Threats, supra note 90.
138 See An Islamist Facing Islamic Terrorism, supra note 20 (calling the bombings
Turkey's "worst-ever terrorist attacks").
139 See Turkey: Most Likely Regime Scenario, supra note 107 (citing the strengths
of a centrist coalition in leading a stable Turkey and making forecasts over the
short-term as to the probabilities of political unrest).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See Turkey: Economic & Social Data, THE PRS GRouP, Oct. 1, 2004, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Turkey Country Files (providing statistics from 1994 to 1998
indicating a decreasing inflation rate and positive GDP growth rates).
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6. CONCLUSION
Both France and Turkey claim to recognize the delicacy re-
quired of secularist policies. But the headscarf is more than a po-
litically sensitive issue. Strict secularist policies disproportionately
upset the weakest communities: recent immigrants and members
of the lowest socioeconomic bracket, who must choose between
faith and basic participation in society. Proponents of these poli-
cies assume those affected will choose school or employment over
faith, but there is much evidence that suggests otherwise. Alterna-
tives available to these communities, particularly foreign or
mosque-run schools that are beyond state observation, may only
aggravate the problems. The result may be economically isolated
communities that pose severe liabilities for the larger society.
Of course the hope in both countries is that moderate Muslims
will help bridge the cultural and political gap between secularists
and Islamists. Unfortunately in France, the headscarf ban and the
accompanying debate in the run-up to its passage, has undercut
the ability of moderates to support the government. 44 In Turkey,
Erdogan s government has more potential, but with pressure on
one side from the secular military, and on the other side from
European political opinion, the headscarf ban will likely remain in
force for the near future.
143 See An Islamist Facing Islamic Terrorism, supra note 20 (noting that most
Turks embrace a moderate Islam and that few approve of al Qaeda terrorism).
144 Pushing for the bill's passage, Raffarin claimed it would "send a powerful
and quick signal," while not discriminating against religions. AFP, supra note 116.
But it has been hard for politicians to sway the growing opinion in Muslim com-
munities that the government is "Islamophobe." Id. Raffarin, in particular, has
used rhetoric that appeared both patronizing and unsympathetic to France's Mus-
lims. See Sciolino, supra note 52 (quoting the prime minister referring to France as
"the old land of Christianity," urging French Muslims to "behave like good citi-
zens," and advising them, "[f]or the most recently arrived -I'm speaking here of
Islam- secularism is a chance, the chance to be a religion of France").
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